Whitepaper · Organisation & AI
The agent makes a decision for which there is no position on the org chart
Why AI does not show up in the results of mid-market companies, and which position on the org chart is missing.
Four out of ten companies with 20 or more employees use artificial intelligence. One third of them report higher costs than planned. The reason is rarely the technology. It is an organizational structure that was built for a problem which is now disappearing.
Thursday, 3:40 pm. A long-standing customer calls the sales office of an industrial company. Instead of 250 units he now wants 400, and he wants them in eight working days instead of fifteen. A good call, one would think. What it sets in motion inside the company is shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 1 · The case
| Frame contract | Request | |
|---|---|---|
| Quantity | 250 units | 400 units |
| Delivery time | 15 working days | 8 working days |
| Order value | 60,000 euros | 96,000 euros |
Fig. 2 · What the request sets in motion
| Department | Rule that applies today | What the rush order changes | Who has to decide |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sales | The frame contract covers 250 units at the agreed price, anything above is priced by the list | Price for 150 extra units and the size of the rush surcharge are open | Head of Sales |
| Finance | Customer credit limit 250,000 euros, 190,000 euros are outstanding | With the order 286,000 euros, the limit is exceeded, an increase to 300,000 euros is possible | Head of Finance |
| Plant | Production slots are allocated, sequence follows the plan | Three orders would have to move, one of them carries a contractual penalty | Plant Manager |
| Purchasing | Main supplier delivers in twelve days, extra costs up to 5,000 euros within own authority | Too late. Second supplier delivers in four days, 14 percent more expensive, around 2,500 euros extra | Head of Purchasing |
| Logistics | Delivery on the regular route | Full delivery in eight days needs a special transport, 1,400 euros | Logistics |
Five departments have to check the request, each with its own rule and its own approval. Together this is less than one hour of work. But the customer waits two days for an answer, because every decision waits for the one before it.
An AI agent with access to order data, credit limits, capacity planning and supplier terms needs one minute for the same five checks. It presents a proposal that respects all five limits at the same time, Fig. 3.
Fig. 2 and 3 · Five decisions, one minute
TodayFive approvals in sequence
2 working daysroughly, until the customer gets an answer
With agentOne proposal for all five
Sales · Finance · Plant · Purchasing · Logistics, simultaneously
1 minuteuntil the proposal is ready
See the five decisions in detail
| Sales | Finance | Plant | Purchasing | Logistics | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Todayin sequence, about 2 working days | 1 · Head of salesprice for the extra volume open | 2 · Head of financecredit limit breached | 3 · Plant managerthree orders would need to move | 4 · Head of purchasingmain supplier too late | 5 · Logisticsspecial delivery needed |
| With agentsimultaneously, 1 minute | Partial delivery, rush surcharge €1,700 | Limit temporarily €300,000, insured | Two non-critical orders each moved by one day | 150 units from the secondary supplier | Both partial deliveries on the regular route |
| Result | Most of the order arrives on time | Limit held | No contract penalty | €820 stays in house | No special delivery |
Fig. 3 · What the agent proposes after one minute
| Department | Proposal | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Sales | Split delivery: 250 units on the original date, 150 units four working days later. Rush surcharge of 1,700 euros on the extra quantity | Customer gets most of the order on time |
| Finance | Credit limit temporarily raised to 300,000 euros, the credit insurer covers the amount | Limit respected |
| Plant | Two non-critical orders moved by one day each, the order with the penalty is not touched | No penalty |
| Purchasing | 150 units from the second supplier, 2,520 euros extra cost, of which 1,700 euros are passed on to the customer through the surcharge | 820 euros stay with the company |
| Logistics | Both part deliveries on the regular route | No special transport |
The proposal is good. The contribution margin is around 6,700 euros higher than if the extra quantity were refused, the calculation is in Fig. 5. But that is not the point.
The agent has done something that nobody in this company is authorized to do. It has taken a pricing decision, a credit decision, a capacity decision, a purchasing decision and a logistics decision in one step and weighed them against each other. Before, this decision did not exist as one decision. It was five partial decisions, each inside its own limit, and the compromise was negotiated between departments. This negotiation was the organizational structure at work.
The agent takes a decision for which there is no position on the org chart.
Why org charts look the way they look
Every organizational structure we know rests on one assumption: judgment is scarce, because it depends on people. The economist Luis Garicano described 25 years ago what hierarchy does in that situation. The front line learns the frequent cases. The rare cases move up to specialists who should not be occupied with routine. The person at the top of the org chart is the person for the case that the level below does not know.1
In other words: the org chart lives in the exceptions. The standard process has been running in the ERP system for twenty years, and nobody needs a manager for that. Approval limits, escalation paths and spans of control exist for the rush order on Thursday afternoon.
This exception is exactly what the machine now takes over. It attacks the very function the hierarchy was built for. Clerical work was automated long ago. Now it is about judgment.
What the numbers say, and what they do not say
Adoption is growing fast, returns are not. In companies with 20 or more employees, the share of AI users has more than doubled within one year.2 One third of these users report clearly higher costs than expected,3 and only one third see a high effect on productivity, Fig. 4.4
Fig. 4 · The numbers
- 17 → 41 %
- of companies with 20 or more employees use AI, previous year versus 2026
- 33 %
- of AI users report clearly higher costs than expected
- 34 %
- of AI users see a high effect on productivity
- 3.9 %
- have cut jobs because of AI
- 27.1 %
- expect to do so in the next five years
The gap between what companies expect and what has actually happened is revealing. In 2025 the ifo Institute asked companies whether they had cut jobs because of AI: 3.9 percent said yes, 93 percent reported no change. Asked about the next five years, 27.1 percent expect job cuts, in manufacturing 37.3 percent.5 So one quarter expects a restructuring that almost nobody has carried out so far. If technology were the obstacle, this gap would be smaller.
The reason has a name, it is just an uncomfortable one. Erik Brynjolfsson and Lorin Hitt showed at 527 US companies that IT investments bring only normal returns in the short term, but up to five times higher productivity contributions over five to seven years. They explain the difference with large and time-consuming investments in what they call organizational capital.6 Later, Brynjolfsson, Rock and Syverson turned this into the productivity J-curve: general-purpose technologies require complementary investments in processes, roles and skills, which cause costs first and returns only later.7
Translated for company leadership: whoever measures the return on AI spending today is measuring in the dip. The organizational investment already shows up as cost, but not yet as return. Whoever concludes from this that AI does not work draws the wrong conclusion from a correct observation. And the other side: whoever never makes the organizational investment never gets out of the dip. That company only has the costs. This is the situation of the one third that complains about higher costs.
Three answers from the organization
In practice there are three organizational answers to the rush order, and the most common one is the worst.
Answer one: everything stays with the departments, the agent gets limits. Each department defines the limit for its own part. Each sets it conservatively, because it alone is blamed for mistakes and gains nothing from the overall optimum. The agent may then only do what the narrowest of the five limits allows. The rush order falls out completely, although it brings the company 6,680 euros, Fig. 5. The system runs, but it produces exactly the results gap everyone complains about. This is the normal case, and it is the reason why pilot projects work technically and deliver nothing economically.
Fig. 5 · Contribution margin of the three options
[Column]: €[Amount] more contribution margin than a rejection
See the calculation
| Euros | Refuse the extra quantity | Full delivery in eight days | Agent proposal |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quantity in units | 250 | 400 | 250 + 150 |
| Revenue, 240 per unit | 60,000 | 96,000 | 96,000 |
| + Rush surcharge to the customer | 0 | 3,500 | 1,700 |
| = Net revenue | 60,000 | 99,500 | 97,700 |
| − Material main supplier, 120 per unit | 30,000 | 30,000 | 30,000 |
| − Material second supplier, 136.80 per unit | 0 | 20,520 | 20,520 |
| = Contribution margin I | 30,000 | 48,980 | 47,180 |
| − Variable production and shipping, 70 per unit | 17,500 | 28,000 | 28,000 |
| − Special transport | 0 | 1,400 | 0 |
| = Contribution margin II | 12,500 | 19,580 | 19,180 |
| Difference to refusal | + 7,080 | + 6,680 | |
| Risk not valued | Customer orders the extra quantity elsewhere | Penalty up to 6,000, delivery reliability for three other customers | None |
Answer two: everything goes to IT. This fails for one single but sufficient reason. IT does not carry the economic consequence. Whoever does not carry the damage cannot be responsible for the limit.
Answer three: a named responsibility for the process as a whole, with its own responsibility for results. A function that owns the path from the request to the incoming payment, with a target system based on contribution margin, delivery reliability and capital tied up, instead of departmental metrics. This function sets the limits for the agent, escalates, and carries the economic consequence. It sits with the managing director or the COO. IT is responsible for something different and no less important: that the agent is traceable, can be switched off, and is logged.
The European AI Act follows the same logic. For high-risk systems, Article 26 requires that operators assign human oversight to natural persons who have the necessary competence, training and authority. Three properties, all of them required.8 Internal approval limits and capacity commitments in business-to-business trade are, by the wording, not in the high-risk class, so the rush order above is not a case for the regulation. The question of responsibility remains. It is then answered by company law and by the organizational duties of the management, and that applies regardless of any deadline.
The obvious solution is the most dangerous one
A common reflex is to put the agent on the org chart like an employee. It sounds tidy. A working paper by Emma Wiles and colleagues from Boston University and BCG, published in 2026, shows what this does. As soon as the same work no longer comes from a tool but from an “AI employee”, managers find fewer errors, feel less responsible, and ask more often for a review by a third party, Fig. 6.9
Fig. 6 · The experiment
- − 17 %
- errors detected
- − 9 pts.
- responsibility attributed to themselves
- + 8 pts.
- responsibility attributed to the system
- + 22 pts.
- requests for review by a third party
Whoever treats the agent like an employee shifts responsibility away from people in practice, although nothing shifts legally. The organization becomes less safe and slower at the same time, because more review loops are demanded.
The experiment that the Mittelstand has already run
On the question whether existing companies can rebuild their hierarchy when machines take over decisions, there is no long-term study. The only solid evidence comes from newly founded US startups. A Harvard study from June 2026 shows that AI-native startups are 25 percent smaller than comparable startups of the same industry and cohort, with half a hierarchy level less, at comparable valuations.10 But these companies never had an old structure. About rebuilding an existing one, the study says nothing.
But there is a precedent, and it sits inside every mid-market company. When IT handed over the operation of servers and applications to service providers, it lost the activity that had justified its existence. The execution was gone, the responsibility stayed. Hardly anyone changed the job description for that.
How this turns out is well documented, Fig. 7. Outsourcing research has found the same pattern since the nineties: those who outsource almost everything mostly fail, those who keep control in-house mostly do not. The most frequently named condition for success is the ability to manage service providers.11 And at German companies with revenue of 100 million euros or more, according to Lünendonk, two thirds of the IT managers see managed services as highly important in the future, but only 11 percent have a position that manages the providers.12
Fig. 7 · The precedent
- 29 %
- success rate when more than 80 percent of the IT budget is outsourced
- 85 %
- success rate when less than 80 percent is outsourced
- 2 of 3
- IT managers at companies with revenue of 100 million euros or more see managed services as highly important for the future
- 11 %
- have a dedicated provider management
- 57 %
- have none
Two thirds want to outsource more, more than half have no position that manages it. It is the same mistake as an agent without a named owner, only ten years older. Whoever outsources operations without building up the ability to manage them ends up with less control and not one cent less responsibility.
The ability that is missing in both cases is the same: set limits, detect deviations, escalate, carry the economic consequence. That is management, not technology.
Four questions for management
Whoever decides about the use of agents in their own company gets further with four questions than with any tool selection.
- Which decision should the agent take? Not which process it automates. Which decision.
- Who carries the economic damage today if this decision is wrong? That person is the candidate for the responsibility, regardless of where they sit on the org chart.
- Does their target system reflect the decision? If the head of sales is measured on order intake, but the agent optimizes the contribution margin, then he is the wrong owner, no matter how well he fits professionally.
- How does the agent recognize its limit, and what happens then? A limit that is not machine-readable does not exist.
Fig. 8 · Four questions before the first agent
- Which decision should the agent take? Not which process it automates. Which decision.
- Who carries the economic damage today if this decision is wrong? That person is the candidate for the responsibility, regardless of where they sit on the org chart.
- Does their target system reflect the decision? If the head of sales is measured on order intake, but the agent optimizes the contribution margin, then he is the wrong owner, no matter how well he fits professionally.
- How does the agent recognize its limit, and what happens then? A limit that is not machine-readable does not exist.
The third question is the most uncomfortable one. In the rush order from the beginning, three of the five departmental metrics get worse through the proposal: the material ratio in purchasing, delivery reliability in the plant, credit risk in finance. What gets better is only the total, and the order intake in sales, which does not own the total. There is nobody whose target system reflects the total. This is exactly the position that is missing, Fig. 9 shows it in numbers.
Fig. 9 · What each department sees
| Metric | Refusal | Agent |
|---|---|---|
| Purchasing, material ratio | 50.0 % | 51.7 % |
| Finance, credit limit | within limit | raised |
| Plant, orders moved | 0 | 2 |
| Logistics, freight | regular route | regular route |
| Sales, order intake | 60,000 | 97,700 |
| Contribution margin II | 12,500 | 19,180 |
That these questions are rarely asked is shown by two surveys from this year. Only 21 percent of companies have a mature governance model for agentic AI, according to a Deloitte survey of 3,235 executives.13 And McKinsey finds among around 500 organizations that those with clearly assigned responsibility for AI reach a clearly higher maturity level than those without.14
An organization does not get better by buying better tools. It gets better when somebody owns the decision that the tools can now take. As long as this person does not exist on the org chart, every AI investment remains a cost center with better software.
Footnotes
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- Luis Garicano, “Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 108, no. 5, 2000, pp. 874 to 904. Source ↩
- Bitkom, press release “Digitalisierung der Wirtschaft”, 11 March 2026, 604 companies with 20 or more employees, survey January to February 2026. Source ↩
- Bitkom, same release, section on effects. Base: companies that already use AI. Source ↩
- DIHK, Digitalisierungsumfrage 2026, survey 10 to 28 November 2025, 4,686 companies, p. 6. Source ↩
- Klaus Wohlrabe, “Mehr KI, weniger Jobs? Was Unternehmen in Deutschland erwarten”, ifo Schnelldienst Digital 8/2025, 16 June 2025, table 2. Source ↩
- Erik Brynjolfsson and Lorin M. Hitt, “Computing Productivity: Firm-Level Evidence”, Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 85, no. 4, 2003, pp. 793 to 808. Source ↩
- Erik Brynjolfsson, Daniel Rock and Chad Syverson, “The Productivity J-Curve”, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 13, no. 1, 2021, pp. 333 to 372. Source ↩
- Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, Article 26(2). The Digital Omnibus, Regulation (EU) 2026/1744, in force since 27 July 2026, does not change this article. Source ↩
- Emma Wiles, Hsu, Bedard and Kropp, “Putting AI on the Org Chart: Evidence on Delegation and Accountability”, working paper, Boston University and BCG, version of 19 September 2026. The effects apply to managers in organizations that already list AI agents on their org chart. Source ↩
- Kim and Koning, “AI-Native Firms”, Harvard Business School Working Paper 26-090, 9 June 2026. The figure applies to the Y Combinator sample, in the wider sample it is 12 percent. Source ↩
- Lacity, Khan and Willcocks, “A review of the IT outsourcing literature: Insights for practice”, Journal of Strategic Information Systems, vol. 18, no. 3, 2009, section 4.1, citing Lacity and Willcocks 1998. Source ↩
- Lünendonk, “IT-Sourcing-Trends 2025/2026”, 121 user companies with revenue of 100 million euros or more, a quarter of them above 1 billion euros, interviews March to May 2025, p. 22 and figure 26. Source ↩
- Deloitte, “Business and IT leaders report AI agents are scaling faster than their guardrails”, 24 April 2026, 3,235 respondents in 24 countries. Source ↩
- McKinsey, “State of AI trust in 2026: Shifting to the agentic era”, 25 March 2026, around 500 organizations. Maturity score 2.6 with clear ownership versus 1.8 without. Source ↩